I thought Plato thought that the good was the beautiful and vice versa—–
I suppose you could come up with counter examples–or at least
ambiguities—say, the assasination of Hitler would have been a
good thing—but could you say that it was a beautiful
thing?
Of course there are obvious affirmations of the good being the beautiful–myself for instance. But, on the other hand, something about lack of humility is not so beautiful.
But surely the good and the beautiful do coincide often. There is a kind of beauty to people helping others–as well as goodness.
But wait, helping to burn down my house would not, from my point view—be good or beautiful.
There are people I have dated who–though very attractive (beautiful?) –I would not want to spend another 10 minutes with.
I guess I am puzzled by the abstractness of the beauty and goodness—-In the abstract, yes good things are beautiful and the beautiful is good, I guess–but without examples, scenarios–they
just seem to stay in Plato’s ideal world.
I prefer the idea of truth—of what is, what shows up. Truth would include beauty and ugliness and good and bad and so on—
leave nothing out—and that I wouldsay is a kind of higher good
and a higher beauty–truth, what is. It is beauty in a more
transcendent sense than Plato’s sense, I think. The truth of being
if you will—is of transcendent beauty and goodness–amd it is right in front of us always. It is at once down to earth –not in an ideal world— and transcendent. This I like.
P>S> I think Plato would say that to whatever extent something
is good it is also beautiful and vice versa—but it is rife with
counter examples when you try to apply it everyday—
I wonder then if there are Platonic Ideals of ugliness and badness
I mean if particular things derive goodness and beauty from participation in good and beauty ideas—then maybe there should be
bad and ugly ideas too. Why make the default of particular things ugly and bad– unless they do participate in Plato’s ideas of good and beauty? Equal time for Ugly!
hi
your weblog is very good
Thank you.
I thought Plato thought that the good was the beautiful and vice versa—–
I suppose you could come up with counter examples–or at least
ambiguities—say, the assasination of Hitler would have been a
good thing—but could you say that it was a beautiful
thing?
Of course there are obvious affirmations of the good being the beautiful–myself for instance. But, on the other hand, something about lack of humility is not so beautiful.
But surely the good and the beautiful do coincide often. There is a kind of beauty to people helping others–as well as goodness.
But wait, helping to burn down my house would not, from my point view—be good or beautiful.
There are people I have dated who–though very attractive (beautiful?) –I would not want to spend another 10 minutes with.
I guess I am puzzled by the abstractness of the beauty and goodness—-In the abstract, yes good things are beautiful and the beautiful is good, I guess–but without examples, scenarios–they
just seem to stay in Plato’s ideal world.
I prefer the idea of truth—of what is, what shows up. Truth would include beauty and ugliness and good and bad and so on—
leave nothing out—and that I wouldsay is a kind of higher good
and a higher beauty–truth, what is. It is beauty in a more
transcendent sense than Plato’s sense, I think. The truth of being
if you will—is of transcendent beauty and goodness–amd it is right in front of us always. It is at once down to earth –not in an ideal world— and transcendent. This I like.
P>S> I think Plato would say that to whatever extent something
is good it is also beautiful and vice versa—but it is rife with
counter examples when you try to apply it everyday—
I wonder then if there are Platonic Ideals of ugliness and badness
I mean if particular things derive goodness and beauty from participation in good and beauty ideas—then maybe there should be
bad and ugly ideas too. Why make the default of particular things ugly and bad– unless they do participate in Plato’s ideas of good and beauty? Equal time for Ugly!